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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MAGILL, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Linder and Associates, Inc. (Linder) appeals from the 
Magistrate Judge's1 order denying recovery for damages 
Linder sustained in the lower level of its building during a 
flood in 1996. Linder bases its claim for recovery on a flood 
insurance policy issued by Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company (Aetna) pursuant to the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP). The district court denied coverage,finding 
that the lower level was a basement and, thus, that Linder's 
damages were excludable under the policy's basement 
exclusion. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Linder owns a multi-level building located on Yunker 
Street in McKees Rocks, Pennsylvania, and uses the 
building to conduct its furniture retail and refurbishing 
business. Since 1988, Linder has obtained flood insurance 
for its building through Aetna, a "Write Your Own" (WYO) 
company under the NFIP. See 44 C.F.R. S 62.23-62.24.2 
Aetna issued Linder a standard flood insurance policy 
(SFIP), the terms of which are prescribed by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) regulations. See 
Nelson v. Becton, 929 F.2d 1287, 1288 (8th Cir. 1991); 42 
U.S.C. S 4013; 44 C.F.R. S 61.4(a), 61.13. The SFIP 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Honorable Francis X. Caiazza, United States Magistrate Judge for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, who presided with the consent of 
the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 636(c). 
 
2. Unless noted otherwise, all citations to the Code of Federal 
Regulations are to those revised as of October 1, 1995. 
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specifically excludes coverage for damages occurring in a 
"basement" of a building, see Article 6(F)(2), reprinted in 
App. at 18, and defines "basement" as "any area of the 
building, including any sunken room or sunken portion of 
a room, having its floor subgrade (below ground level) on all 
sides." Article 2, reprinted in App. at 11. 
 
The lower level or alley side of Linder's building includes 
two garage doors used by trucks to pick up and deliver 
furniture incident to Linder's business. The lower level floor 
is approximately four inches below the threshold of the 
garage doors, and concrete ramps have been installed to 
facilitate entering and leaving. According to Linder's owner, 
the alley also was "a few inches down from the threshold" 
when he purchased the building in 1978. Trial Tr. at 105, 
reprinted in App. at 310. However, no one knows the exact 
height differential between the alley and the threshold at 
that time. 
 
Between 1978 and 1996, crushed limestone gravel was 
dumped into the alley on four different occasions, raising 
the surface level of the alley to the same height as the 
threshold. The limestone had been dumped over the years 
for the sole purpose of keeping the alley level. No one is 
sure how much the alley has risen since 1978, but Linder's 
expert testified that he found two inches of crushed 
limestone adjacent to the garage doors in 1997. 
 
A flood in January 1996 damaged most of the furniture 
stored in the lower level of Linder's building. After Linder 
filed a claim with Aetna under the SFIP, Aetna's claims 
adjuster, Robert Massof, investigated Linder's building. Mr. 
Massof determined that the entire lower level floor was 
below ground level. He believed that the lower levelfloor at 
the rear side of the building was below ground level 
because the floor was lower than the alley. Aetna, relying 
on the basement exclusion and Mr. Massof 's findings, 
refused to provide coverage for damages occurring in the 
lower level. 
 
Linder subsequently filed suit,3 contending that the lower 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Linder based federal jurisdiction under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. S 4072. 
Although we originally questioned the existence of federal subject matter 
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level was not a "basement" as defined in the policy. Linder 
conceded that three sides of the lower level floor were well 
below ground level, but argued that the floor at the rear 
side of the building was not below ground level. Without 
supporting evidence, the insured argued the term"ground 
level" should be defined as the natural grade existing at the 
time the building was built, and not as the surface level of 
the built-up alley. The Magistrate Judge disagreed with 
Linder and, after a one day bench trial, entered judgment 
in favor of Aetna. 
 
II. 
 
It is well settled that federal common law governs the 
interpretation of the SFIP at issue here. See McHugh v. 
United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, ___ F.3d #6D6D 6D#, 1998 WL 665857, at 
*2 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 1998); Carneiro da Cunha v. Standard 
Fire Ins. Co./Aetna Flood Ins. Program, 129 F.3d 581, 584 
(11th Cir. 1997); Leland v. Federal Ins. Adm'r , 934 F.2d 
524, 529 (4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, "neither the statutory 
nor decisional law of any particular state is applicable to 
the case at bar." Sodowski v. National Flood Ins. Program, 
834 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 1987) (quotations omitted). 
 
We utilize "standard insurance law principles" to 
construe the SFIP. Id. (quotations omitted); see also 
Carneiro da Cunha, 129 F.3d at 584; Leland , 934 F.2d at 
530. Under these principles, we interpret the SFIP in 
accordance with its plain, unambiguous meaning, see 
Carneiro da Cunha, 129 F.3d at 585; Sodowski , 834 F.2d at 
656, remaining cognizant that its interpretation should be 
"uniform throughout the country" and that"coverage 
should not vary from state to state." Becton , 929 F.2d at 
1291. Although exclusions and ambiguities in the policy are 
strictly construed against the insurer, we must give effect to 
the "[c]lear policy language," and refrain from "tortur[ing] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
jurisdiction under this statute and asked the parties for supplemental 
briefs, this court's recent decision in Van Holt v. Liberty Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co., ___ F.3d ___, No. 97-5098 (3d Cir. Nov. 25, 1998), makes 
clear that this statute does, indeed, confer subject matter jurisdiction 
of 
this action in federal court. Id. at 10. 
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the language to create ambiguities." Selko v. Hole Ins. Co., 
139 F.3d 146, 152 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). 
If the policy is susceptible to two constructions, however, 
we will adopt the one more favorable to the insured. See 
Aschenbrenner v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. , 292 
U.S. 80, 84-85 (1934). 
 
In this case, we conclude that the SFIP clearly and 
unambiguously precludes coverage for damages in Linder's 
lower level. The SFIP defines "basement" as"any area of the 
building . . . having its floor subgrade (below ground level) 
on all sides." Article 2, reprinted in App. at 11. Each court 
considering the SFIP's basement exclusion has found its 
language to be clear and unambiguous. See Becton , 929 
F.2d at 1289-90; Unger v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 849 F. 
Supp. 839, 846 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). "[I]t is obvious from Becton 
that the `ground level' referred to in the policy definition[ ] 
is intended to be that area close and adjacent to the lower 
level door." Unger, 849 F. Supp. at 846. If a person must 
step up when exiting the lower level to the outside, the 
lower level is below ground level and, thus, is a basement. 
See Becton, 929 F.2d at 1289 ("In order to go from that 
level out to the yard, it was necessary to go up at least one 
step. The floor levels therefore were subgrade . .. ."). This 
is true even if one must step up only an inch when going 
outside. See id. ("The extent to which they were subgrade, 
whether 6, 8, or 40 inches, is immaterial under the policy. 
The only question is whether they were subgrade or at 
ground level."). Conversely, if "one has to step up to enter 
the lower level and must step down when leaving the lower 
level," the lower level is not a basement. Unger, 849 F. 
Supp. at 846. 
 
The parties disagree only as to whether the rear side of 
the lower level is below ground level. Aetna's claims 
adjuster testified that shortly after the flood, the alley was 
even with the threshold, which is approximately four inches 
above the lower level floor. To enter the lower level from the 
alley, it was thus necessary to step down onto the lower 
level floor. The lower level floor at the rear side of the 
building, therefore, is below ground level and, hence, is a 
"basement" as that term is defined in the SFIP. The district 
court did not err in its conclusion. 
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In an effort to avoid this obvious policy exclusion, Linder 
makes two arguments: (1) the district court clearly erred 
when finding that the alley surface was above the lower 
level floor at the time of the flood, and (2) the district court 
erred in defining "ground level" as the level of the alley 
outside the garage doors at the time of the flood. We 
summarily dispose of Linder's first argument. Linder points 
to testimony by its witnesses that the alley was lower than 
the lower level floor at the time of the flood. However, as 
explained above, Mr. Massof examined the building shortly 
after the flood and testified that the alley was even with the 
threshold, which is four inches above the lower level floor. 
Moreover, Linder's expert found only two inches of crushed 
limestone adjacent to the garage doors, thus suggesting 
that the alley was at least two inches higher than the lower 
level floor before the flood. When there are two permissible 
views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them 
cannot be clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). Accordingly, the 
district court did not clearly err in finding that the lower 
level was below the alley surface. 
 
We also reject Linder's second argument. Linder contends 
that the term "ground level" is ambiguous and should be 
defined as the existing grade at the time Linder's building 
was originally constructed, which supposedly was lower 
than the lower level floor. However, construing"ground 
level" in the policy to mean the ground level surrounding 
Linder's building at some point in time other than the time 
of flooding seems unreasonable. Coverage under aflood 
insurance policy is predicated upon the occurrence of a 
flood. There cannot be a flood unless water rises above and 
flows over the existing ground level. It only makes sense, 
therefore, to equate "ground level" in theflood insurance 
policy as the ground level that was actually flooded, i.e., as 
the ground level at the time of the flood. 
 
Moreover, Linder failed to present any admissible 
evidence suggesting that its proposed definition is a 
reasonable interpretation of the term "ground level." Linder 
contends that its proposed definition is supported by an 
"Outline Guide to the Standard Flood Insurance Policy" 
which should have been considered as a party admission 
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under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) and (D). 4 We 
believe that the district court appropriately exercised its 
discretion in excluding this document, see Glass v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(review for abuse of discretion), because it is clear that the 
Outline Guide was not admissible as a party admission. 
 
The Outline Guide was drafted by Computer Sciences 
Corporation, a "fiscal agent" of the NFIP that"does not 
underwrite flood insurance policies" and does not have 
"ultimate authority over the issuance of policies and the 
approval or denial of claims." Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 
393, 395 (6th Cir. 1991). Apparently, Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company, a WYO company like Aetna, produced 
the Outline Guide during trial in a different suit concerning 
coverage under a SFIP. See Unger v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 
849 F. Supp. 839, 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). In that litigation, 
Liberty Mutual asserted that the Outline Guide provided a 
binding interpretation of the term "ground level" in the 
SFIP. Because Liberty Mutual was defending itself in its 
capacity as a WYO company in that case, Linder contends 
that the Outline Guide should have been admitted in this 
case as a party admission. Linder's argument proceeds 
along these lines: Liberty Mutual, as a WYO, is an agent of 
FEMA; Liberty Mutual's assertion that the Outline Guide 
provided a binding interpretation of the term "ground level" 
in the SFIP constitutes a binding admission on behalf of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In pertinent part, the Outline Guide provides the following: 
 
       2. basements* 
 
       a. a basement is any area of a building whosefloor is below 
       ground level on all sides 
 
        (1) ground level means the naturally existing grade at the time 
       of original construction 
 
         (a) backfill against the structure after original construction 
       does not create a basement 
 
        . . . . 
 
        (5) if any portion of the floor in question is at or above ground 
       level, the area is not a basement. 
 
Outline Guide S VI(B)(2), reprinted in  App. at 70-71. 
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FEMA to the same effect; FEMA's purported admission of 
the Outline Guide's applicability to determinations of 
coverage under the SFIP is binding on FEMA's agents; and 
Aetna, as a WYO company, is now bound by the Outline 
Guide's definition of "ground level." 
 
There are several flaws in Linder's argument. Most 
notably, this court recently explained that "WYO companies 
are not general agents of the federal government." Van Holt 
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., ___ F.3d ___, No. 97-5098, at 
7 (3d Cir. Nov. 25, 1998). The Federal Regulations support 
this conclusion. See 44 C.F.R. S 62.23(g) ("WYO Companies 
shall not be agents of the Federal Government"). Moreover, 
counsel for FEMA has asserted that "[t]he Outline Guide 
was not adopted by FEMA nor was it approved by FEMA; 
and therefore it is not an official FEMA document." Letter 
from Margaret M. Bees, Trial Attorney for FEMA, to David 
M. Paul, counsel for Linder, and Stanley A. Winikoff, 
counsel for Aetna (Nov. 4, 1997), reprinted in  App. at 146. 
Furthermore, when advocating this particular definition of 
"ground level" before the district court, Linder's counsel 
told the court that "we right now can't represent to the 
Court that [this proposed definition] is an existing PHEMA 
[sic] guideline . . . ." Trial Tr. at 83, reprinted in App. at 
288. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to admit the Outline Guide as a party 
admission.5 
 
In sum, FEMA, which "fixes the terms and conditions of 
the" SFIP, Van Holt, No. 97-5098, at 7, explicitly disavows 
Linder's proposed definition of the term "ground level." 
Moreover, neither FEMA nor any court has ever advocated 
or accepted a definition of "ground level" other than that 
espoused by the Becton and Unger courts. To give credence 
to Linder's proposed definition, we would be straining to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In one paragraph of the fact section of its opening brief, Linder also 
complains that the Magisrate Judge wrongfully excluded a government 
document setting forth a definition of "natural grade." See Appellant's 
Br. 
at 12-13. Because Linder failed to present any argument on this matter, 
we hold that Linder has waived any challenge to the exclusion of that 
document. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that "casual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment 
insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal"). 
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find an ambiguity where none exists, an exercise that we 
will not undertake. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
United States Fire Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 521, 525 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
Magistrate Judge. 
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